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Abstract 
 
The focus of study is a dialogue situation in which one party holds that P 
while the other holds that ~P. A simple way to establish harmony between the 
parties in dialogue is to insist that each should include the other’s point of 
view. This is unsatisfactory because it results in an inconsistent set of beliefs. 
Clarity is essential, therefore, on how to deal with inconsistency. In this paper, 
I will proceed in two steps. In the first, I will indicate how some attempts at 
trying to manage contradictions in terms of ontology remain unsatisfactory. In 
the second step, I will introduce and evaluate another way in terms of belief 
and acceptance. I make an original application of L.J. Cohen’s distinction 
between belief and acceptance, the former being a matter of feeling, the latter 
a matter of policy in reasoning. 
 
 
We often consider dialogue an interaction between two individuals or groups with 
different opinions about something. In simple terms, the two parties in constructive 
dialogue engage in conversation so as to become more transparent to each other, and, 
through that very process, to themselves. If the difference of opinion is not resolved, 
or is not put aside as irrelevant, it can often be reduced to a set of statements that 
express a contradiction. After some time, it becomes obvious that one party holds that 
P while the other holds that ~P. From this simple observation, it follows that the usual 
attempt to establish harmony between the different parties in dialogue by insisting 
that each should include the other’s point of view is unsatisfactory. The problem is 
that enlarging one’s horizon to include the other’s point of view very often results in 
an inconsistent set of beliefs, namely a set that includes both P and ~P. In any 
discussion on dialogue, therefore, it is crucial to be clear about the nature of 
contradictions in one’s set of beliefs and to have some strategy about how to handle 
inconsistency. In this paper, I will proceed in two steps. In the first, I will indicate 
how some attempts at trying to manage contradictions in terms of ontology remain 
unsatisfactory. In the second step, I will introduce and evaluate another way in terms 
of belief and acceptance.  
Managing Contradictions in terms of Ontology 
 Standard logic cannot handle inconsistency. The major threat from admitting 
contradiction within a set of beliefs is that of explosion. As can be shown quite easily, 
when a set of propositions contains even one single proposition together with its 
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negation, then it will be possible to deduce any proposition whatsoever.1 This kind of 
explosion occurs not only in the case of sets of beliefs whose elements are distinct and 
clearly evident. It occurs also for sets of beliefs considered in conjunction with all the 
logical consequences of those beliefs. It is customary to call a set of axiomatic beliefs 
together with all their logical consequences a theory. So even a theory is prone to 
explosion because digging below the surface of the axioms will enable the deduction 
of practically any proposition whatsoever. 
 It is interesting to recall Aristotle’s discussion on contradiction, in 
Metaphysics Book Γ, which contains the famous line: ‘A thing cannot at the same 
time be and not be’ (Aristotle 1941, 996b30). This formulation is related to the being 
of a thing, rather than to what one can say about the thing. Following Aristotle, many 
have considered the principle of contradiction as valid for all being. In Aristotelian 
metaphysics, it is considered a primary principle, an indispensable tool, because it 
allows the apprehension of being in its intrinsic intelligibility. Since it excludes its 
own negation, it cannot be denied, but neither can it be derived. This means that, for a 
standard ontology, such as the one assumed by many philosophers in the course of 
history ranging from Aristotle to the early Wittgenstein, there are two laws. The first, 
the law of excluded middle, holds that, of a pair of propositions P and ∼P, at least one 
obtains. This fact is classically expressed by the phrase tertium non datur. The second 
law, that of contradiction holds that, of a pair of propositions P and ∼P, at most one 
obtains. Moreover, there are indications that Aristotle wasn’t ignorant of the 
explosive nature of even a single inconsistency in one’s belief system. For instance, 
he claims that ‘if words have no meaning, our reasoning with one another, and indeed 
with ourselves, has been annihilated; for it is impossible to think of anything if we do 
not think of one thing’ (Aristotle 1941, 1006b 8-10; cf.: Thomas Aquinas 1964-1981, 
1a 2ae, Q 94, art. 2; Dancy 1975). 
 The upshot is that standard logic is explosive in the presence of inconsistency. 
In other words, inconsistency is not a matter of degree. You cannot have some of it, or 
more of it. One instance of inconsistency within a theory contaminates and 
destabilises the system completely. 
 This observation, however, does not help much in my project of giving an 
account of the dialogue situation in its complexity. In normal practice, an individual 
often seems capable of endorsing a set of beliefs that is rendered inconsistent because 
of that individual’s inclusion of another individual’s beliefs. Normal people are 
somewhat immune to logical explosion. They seem capable of containing various 
kinds of inconsistency within their belief systems. Their rationality seems to have a 
certain flexibility that helps them put such inconsistencies on hold, as it were, until 
further information is available.  
 It was probably such everyday skills that gave rise to some peculiar remarks in 
the writings of the later Wittgenstein. For instance, during one of his early discussions 
with members of the Vienna Circle, he is claimed to have made the following 
prediction: ‘I am prepared to predict that there will be mathematical investigations of 
calculi containing contradictions and people will pride themselves on having 
emancipated themselves from consistency too.’ (Goldstein 1989, 540). In his Remarks 
on the Foundations of Mathematics, he writes: ‘But you can’t allow a contradiction to 
stand: Why not? We do sometimes use this form in our talk, of course not often – but 
                                                 
1 Starting from the premise P that A & ∼A, one can see how any other proposition follows because of 
the following simple argument. For all A, A ⇒ (A or B). From P, however, we hold also that ∼A. (A 
or B) & ∼A ⇒ B. Therefore we can conclude that B, for any B whatsoever. 
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one could imagine a technique of language in which it was a regular instrument. It 
might for example be said of an object in motion that it existed and did not exist in 
this place; change might be expressed by means of a contradiction’ (Wittgenstein 
1967, V 8). 2 
 Following Wittgenstein’s suggestion, some have tried to manage 
inconsistency by constructing what may be called a hyper-ontology (Rescher et al. 
1980). The basic idea is to have an ontology that is perforated at some points. This 
means that, as regards these points, one can neither hold that P nor that ~P. Such an 
artificial world can also have another feature. It could also be superimposed, in the 
sense that it contains points about which one can hold both that P and that ~P. This is 
an ontological way of ensuring that contradictions do not contaminate the entire 
system. Although interesting and perhaps applicable in some areas of modern science, 
it leaves a lot to be desired in the way of practical usefulness. The hyper-ontology it 
depends on seems to be completely ad hoc.3  
 A better way of examining how to deal with inconsistency is in terms of 
propositional attitudes. Are there various ways in which we endorse a proposition?  
Managing Contradictions in terms of Belief and Acceptance 
 My proposal is to see whether drawing a distinction between belief and 
acceptance can be useful in understanding dialogue situations that boil down to a 
contradiction. One of the best studies of belief and acceptance to my knowledge is 
that of L. Jonathan Cohen (1992). He starts by situating René Descartes and David 
Hume as the two opposite extreme positions, the former holding that we acquire 
knowledge ultimately by a voluntary judgement, the latter, on the contrary, holding 
that knowledge is acquired by involuntary growth of cognitive feeling. The correct 
distinction between belief and acceptance must take into consideration the complexity 
of the issue sliding neither to one side nor the other. The essential difference occurs 
because belief needs to be seen as a disposition to feel that a proposition is true. for 
instance, I may have a disposition to feel that eating too many peanuts will cause me 
heartburn. Another way of talking about this state of affairs is to say that I believe 
peanuts cause me heartburn, and I show this in my behaviour. On the contrary, 
acceptance needs to be seen as a deliberate act, or a policy for reasoning, for example 
the policy of considering a given proposition a premise for further reasoning. 
‘“Belief” carries no conceptual implications about reasoning, “acceptance” carries 
none about feelings’ (Cohen 1992, 5).  
 According to this distinction, since belief is a disposition, it may be invisible 
until the appropriate moment comes when it becomes evident. My disposition to feel 
that a given proposition is true or false is only evident when my attention is turned to 
that proposition. For instance, when faced with something I never directly thought of 
before, say when faced with the proposition ‘the world contains a lot of evil but 
ultimately truth and goodness will prevail’, then I will discover where my disposition 
leads me. It may lead me to realise that I believe it, or it may lead me to realise that I 
don’t. Acceptance is different. It is a deliberate and conscious operation of choosing a 
proposition as a starting point. This deliberate act can even go against my personal 
                                                 
2 Wittgenstein’s remarks bearing on contradiction are scattered in a number places. For example 
Wittgenstein 1967, II 78, 81, 82; III 56-60; III 87; V 12, 13, 21, 26, 28. For further details, see Priest et 
al. 1989; Priest et al. 1993; Priest 1998. 
3 I discuss the prospects of their proposal with respect to Wittgenstein’s project in Caruana 
forthcoming. 
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feelings. Accepting that P means taking P as a premise; in other words, taking P as 
true for the sake of the argument, whether one feels that P is true or not.   
 In a few paragraphs of Cohen’s chapter one §6, there is a mention of the 
problem of inconsistency in terms of belief and acceptance. It is this part that interests 
me most. In a nutshell, Cohen claims that belief that P and belief that ~P can co-exist 
within the same individual as a turmoil of feelings or inclinations. This is only human, 
given our considerable variety of natural tendencies fixed upon us by previous 
educational conditioning. On the contrary, acceptance that P and acceptance that ~P 
can co-exist within the same individual only when that person is manifestly lacking in 
rationality. Since acceptance is voluntary, such a person will come across as someone 
annoyingly absurd. In Cohen’s own words: ‘Because belief is not deductively closed, 
it is not necessarily an intellectual disaster if a person does have an inconsistency 
between some of his beliefs. But for acceptance the analogous situation may be 
disastrous’ (Cohen, 1992, 36). 
 Consider now a simple case of dialogue, say, between her and me. We 
disagree on the truth-value of P. I take P to be true. She, as far as I can see, takes P to 
be false. My basic proposal is to uncover the subtle but important difference between 
the two situations: 
 (S1)   I accept that she believes that ~P  
 (S2)   I accept that she accepts that ~P 
These are just two of the many possible combinations. For each protagonist of the 
dialogue, there are two possible options, made available by the introduction of the 
distinction between belief and acceptance. Of all the permutations possible, the most 
significant pair is the one represented by S1 and S2. 
 S1 is practically saying that I accept that her disagreement with me issues 
from a belief. It issues, therefore, from her disposition to feel that P is false. 
Describing my situation as S1 enables me to hold that she holds that ~P not because 
she deliberately considers it a premise for her reasoning, but because of the way she is 
conditioned by her upbringing. S1 offers me, therefore, the possibility of thinking 
how she endorses ~P without being directly and consciously responsible of doing so.  
 The appearance of a clear contradiction threatening my endorsing what she 
holds is not there any longer. Such a naked contradiction emerges only when the 
situation is described as S2. It emerges because both my propositional attitude 
towards P and hers about ~P are on the same level, namely that of acceptance. 
Accepting both P and ~P will result in clear inconsistency. As distinct from this, the 
possibility described by S1 implies that dialogue may still continue.  
 What are the merits of this proposal? There are at least two. Firstly, it does 
away with the worry of how to contain a contradiction within a set of beliefs. A 
fortiori, it does not need to understand dialogue in terms of a hyper-ontology designed 
specifically to show how one and the same rational person may hold both that P and 
that ~P. Secondly, it introduces a new level of dialogue, namely the level of self-
examination. One is encouraged to be see whether one’s contribution to a dialogue is 
made up of propositions one believes or of propositions one accepts. In other words, it 
highlights the possibility that some aspects of a dialogue situation may be better 
understood on the level of feelings. Other aspects may be better understood on the 
level of strategies in reasoning. In the example above, as described by S1, I may hope 
that she realises that her believing that ~P should be overcome. In a parallel but 
opposite fashion, the same thing may be hoped by her about my realising that some of 
my beliefs should be overcome, if and when I become more aware of what I should 
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rationally accept as a good starting point for correct reasoning. 
 This account of a dialogue situation is richer than the one I started with. It is 
thus more responsible to real-life situations. It certainly does not tell us how to 
resolve a given conflict of opinions. It nevertheless allows interesting, non-explosive 
ways of managing such a conflict. 
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